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The 1996 Telecommunications Act represents a major turn in U.S. policy towards
“deregulation.” Instead of tying price deregulation to the opening of entry in a market that has been
regulated for decades, the Act creates a maze of new regulatory responsibilities for the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the states. Incumbent local telephone companies, who
were being freed from cost-based regulation prior to 1996, are now subject to detailed regulation of
their wholesale services. Specifically, they must “unbundle” their network facilities into a large
number of components and lease these components or “elements” to entrants at cost. Moreover, the
Bell companies are not permitted to compete with long distance companies until they satisfy
regulators that they have complied with a large number of interconnection requirements. This
complex new regulatory regime has been the source of three years of regulatory battles and legal
challenges and has needlessly delayed facilities-based entry into telecommunications. It would be
far better if the FCC and the states were to pursue a strategy of full deregulation. The regulators
should announce a date sufficiently far in the future at which all rate and entry regulation will cease,
much as the Congress did for airlines in 1978. This would place potential competitors and customers
on notice that fully flexible rates will be in place on this date and that new opportunities could be
available for both. It also would reduce the value of rent seeking before the regulatory commissions
and the never-ending cycle of rulemakings and court appeals.1 See, for example, Train (1991). For a useful review of the economics and politics of regulation, see Noll
(1989) and Brauetigam (1989). For a review of issues of regulatory design and asymmetric information, see Baron
(1989).1
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Managed Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
Robert W. Crandall
The last two decades may readily be described as the era of the “triumph of markets.” Statist
controls on the delivery of everything from basic materials, such as steel, to advanced services, such
as telecommunications, are rapidly disappearing. Western Europe and Eastern Europe are converging
toward the U.S. model of private markets with limited regulation as the best alternative for delivering
important goods and services to their citizens. After the dust settles from the recent spate of currency
collapses, Asia may well follow.
Despite these successes, there are a few ominous clouds on the horizon. The trend toward
open, competitive markets is in danger of being preempted by legislators and regulators who are now
mustering support for the notion that government must guide the evolution to competition to prevent
powerful interests -- the erstwhile regulated monopolists -- from derailing the process for their own
private gains. These clouds loom most particularly over the electricity and telecommunications
sectors, but in this paper I will concentrate most on the dangers that are now apparent in the recent
“deregulation” of telecommunications.
Deregulation versus Optimal Regulation: The Results From Other Sectors
The theory of “optimal” regulation has not changed much in the past twenty or thirty years,
except for the developments in dealing with asymmetric information and adverse incentive effects.
1
Regulators of railroads, trucking, airlines, telephone services, and pipelines must have been aware
of the requisites for efficient resource allocation long before the deregulatory movement began in
the 1970s. Few could have believed that blocking new entry in markets that were surely not natural
monopolies was consistent with the maximization of economic welfare. Yet, we knew then and
surely know now with much greater certainty that regulators' goals were not simply the pursuit of2 Stigler (1971); Posner (1974); Peltzman(1976).
3 Winston (1993 and 1998); Crandall and Ellig (1997).
4 Morrison and Winston (1986 and 1995).
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maximum consumer welfare. The theory of regulation, developed by Stigler, Posner, Peltzman,
2 and
others surely trumped the theory of “optimal” regulation that is still advanced by well-meaning
theorists.
The proof is obviously in the results of the deregulatory exercises of the 1970s and 1980s.
In particular, the partial or full deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines led to very large
economic welfare gains -- gains that continued to grow in the years following deregulation.
3 Most
of the gains occurred through changes in the organization of these industries, not simply through an
adjustment of prices by the erstwhile regulated firms. In trucking and airlines, in particular,
regulatory barriers to entry had led to an inefficient organization of production and the creation of
monopoly power. The railroads had been forced to maintain uneconomic services that were
subsidized by declining monopoly rents from other services that were imperfectly protected from
entry by regulators.
When deregulation of the transportation sector came, entry barriers were eliminated rather
quickly and pricing freedom was granted almost immediately. The industry adjustment to this new
order was generally far from orderly. In trucking and airlines, in particular, entrants rushed in and
with often disastrous results. Hundreds of new trucking firms were formed only to fail. New airlines,
such as Air One, New York Air, and Peoples Express suffered a similar fate. At the same time,
established carriers, such as Continental, TWA, National, and Eastern either proceeded through
bankruptcy reorganization or quietly disappeared. Others, such as Northwest, flirted with bankruptcy.
Established trucking firms lost billions of dollars in the capitalized value of operating certificates --
i.e., grants of monopoly privilege.
While most regulators of these industries must have known that their regimes were not
producing optimal industry performance, few would have been able to predict how their industry
would be structured or perform once all regulatory barriers and restraints were removed. There is no
evidence that I am aware of that shows that the Civil Aeronautics Board foresaw the development
of hub-and-spoke route systems.
4 Surely, the Interstate Commerce Commission could not have
predicted how the railroads would spin off short lines to small, efficient operators or that the less-5 Winston (1993).
6 See, for example, Robyn (1987) or Derthick and Quirk (1985).
7 Winston, et.al. (1990).
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than-truckload transportation sector would evolve into a set of very large national firms, such as
Federal Express, that combine air and trucking into a much more efficient national system.
We now know that the gains from the deregulation of the transportation sector have been
enormous, totaling perhaps $50 billion per year in current dollars.
5 Put another way, the reduction
of economic welfare due to traditional economic regulation in this sector was huge. Yet the politics
of regulation made it difficult to dispatch these regulators to more productive pursuits.
6 The creation
and distribution of economic rents through regulation were sufficient to keep the Congress from
ending these long-term drags on our economy. A variety of farm programs, the postal monopoly, and
anti-dumping laws continue to exist for similar reasons.   
The Next Step in Deregulation: Network Industries
I do not wish to dwell on the successes or failures of the past, but rather to contrast the
extraordinarily successful deregulatory policies of the past twenty years with the new managed
liberalization and deregulation that is enveloping the telecommunications and electricity sectors.
Virtually all of the deregulated industries are “network” industries of some variety. Airlines, trucking
companies, railroads, and natural gas pipelines are similar in this respect to telecommunications and
electricity. But the airlines and trucking companies did not own most of their network infrastructure,
even when regulated, and no one would contend that such vertical integration would be efficient or
even feasible.  As long as the government provided open, equal access to this infrastructure,
competition could thrive when regulatory barriers to entry were removed. Railroads were clearly a
different story, but over time their network infrastructure conferred much lower monopoly rents
because they had to compete with the other transportation sectors.
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In electricity and telecommunications, like railroads and pipelines, the carriers own and
control the infrastructure subject to a government license to operate. Deregulating them without
opening access to this infrastructure could create major problems of natural-monopoly exploitation
by the incumbents that would offset the productive and allocative efficiency gains created by8 Batchelor (1998) p. 14.
9 Costello and Duann (1996)
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releasing the firms from their regulatory yoke. But is this infrastructure the source of natural
monopoly? And if so, how long will this monopoly endure in the face of technological change?
These are the key questions that are often overlooked as politicians and regulators debate entry and
interconnection to the network.
In the discussion that follows, I shall focus almost entirely upon telecommunications because
this sector offers the most promising next target for full deregulation even though politicians seem
far from admitting it. It may also be the most important sector of the economy -- except for national
defense -- still largely under government control.
The Separation of Infrastructure from Service Delivery
One obvious choice for liberalizing a network industry with natural-monopoly infrastructure
is simply to separate the infrastructure from the delivery of the service. This is precisely the option
chosen by the United Kingdom in privatizing and liberalizing its railroads and now even being
considered for the London Underground.
8 The ownership of the track is separate from the ownership
and operation of the rolling stock. Competitive service providers lease rights to use the track from
the infrastructure company at rates that are controlled by regulators. Some have even proposed a
similar separation for U.S. (freight) railroads who are slowly toward a national duopoly. By
separating the track from railroad operation, the number of carriers that could compete successfully
might expand considerably. 
A similar, but less far-reaching solution has been devised for U.S. natural-gas pipelines. At
one time pipelines contracted for all of their natural gas from producers and sold it on a delivered
basis to commercial users, industrial firms, and retail utilities. After the debacle of the 1970s during
which these pipelines purchased gas for forward delivery at prices that were far in excess of the
market-clearing prices in subsequent years, the pipelines were forced to provide open access to
independent companies who could market their gas directly to customers. Thus, the pipelines opened
their infrastructure to competitors, albeit at rates that are still regulated today.
910 For a useful summary of these issues, see Smith (1996).
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Telecommunications and electricity “deregulation” have followed a somewhat similar course,
but with some important differences. First, everyone recognizes that the generation of electrical
energy is far from a natural monopoly except perhaps in remote geographic areas with very limited
demand. Modern transmission technologies allow most metropolitan areas to import electricity over
considerable distances. Given the minimum efficient scale in fossil-fuel burning plants (or even
nuclear plants), no generator could enjoy monopoly power. Transmission and retail distribution of
this power is quite another matter. The obvious first step in liberalization is therefore to allow
competition among rival generators and to separate the transmission and distribution functions from
generation. The stumbling block is equally obvious: How is access to the transmission and
distribution network to be governed? Should there be a single “poolco” that accepts bids for
electricity, arranges for transmission, and sells the power to downstream customers? If so, who is
to control the prices charged for these downstream sales? Or should all downstream users be free to
negotiate for the delivery of their own electricity, presumably through a variety of intermediaries?
10
In telecommunications, there is no “generation.” Messages, voice or data, are originated and
received by the same widely dispersed parties or network subscribers. The connection of these
subscribers to the network involves large fixed costs, but very mild economies of scale. The
transmission of their messages (bit streams) from the first collection point -- the network switch --
to the last distribution point -- another switch -- is subject to large scale economies. Nevertheless,
the economies of scale in transmission do not appear large enough to preclude competition, given
the size of the market. The United States has a variety of such networks; some are regional and a few
are national in scope. The natural monopoly in telecommunications -- if there is one -- is in the local
distribution of messages to the subscriber. As a result, these local monopolies could conceivably be
divorced from the national or regional distribution function. In fact, a few countries have actually
attempted such a divorce -- most notably the United States and, to a limited, extent Japan.
The vertical separation of facilities from the delivery of services may be a satisfactory
second-best solution to the bottleneck-monopoly problem in industries that have little potential for
technological change, such as railroads or pipelines. But in technologically progressive industries,
such as telecommunications, such separation creates enormous problems of modifying and
expanding the infrastructure to deliver new services or to reflect rapid progress in the technology for11 See Hausman (1997) for the extraordinarily large losses caused by the regulatory delays in allowing new
telecommunications services.
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delivering existing services. In the U.S., the separation of ownership of the local network from
equipment manufacturing and long-distance service delivery led to continual problems of defining
the limits of “local” or “long-distance” service and separating research and development from
manufacturing.  
Interconnection and Regulation in Network Industries
Most of our successful examples of deregulation have involved mundane industries that are
not particularly subject to rapid technological change. Railroads, trucks, and airplanes have changed
little since the Ford Administration began to press for deregulation 25 years ago. The disincentives
to innovation caused by regulation in these sectors were arguably less costly than those currently
affecting telecommunications.
11 Equally important, one can hardly be certain that the existing
telecommunications network architecture is optimally designed even if it were to reflect only current
technology, not the accumulated effects of past investment decisions. Releasing the industry from
regulatory controls could well result in a very different configuration of facilities and services.
In every country, telecommunications was once a government-owned or a government-
controlled monopoly. The monopolist controlled all aspects of service, including the types of
customer equipment that could be used to obtain service. Clearly, any liberalization of this industry
requires that entrants be able to interconnect with the incumbent, monopoly carrier or the entrant’s
subscribers will be unable to communicate with the incumbent's subscribers. But what does
“interconnect” mean?  This turns out to be the central question in most of the debates raging around
current telecom policy.
In the simplest sense, interconnection in telecommunications simply means the ability to
terminate another carrier's traffic destined for its own subscribers and the ability to obtain similar
termination from the other carrier for traffic originated by its own subscribers. Carriers must agree
to protocols for accepting and delivering traffic to one another. Such arrangements have existed for
decades in the United States because it has had hundreds of  geographically-adjacent monopoly
carriers. Most of these carriers are rural telephone cooperatives, but every state has a mix of12 See Crandall (1991) or Brock (1984) for a discussion of this history.
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“independent” and “Bell” companies providing local service to different communities. These
adjacent monopolists have had to interconnect to one another to be able to offer a complete service
because commercial and social relations transcend telephone company franchise boundaries. These
carriers simply built transmission lines between their switches that delivered intercompany traffic
at no charge to either company. Such “bill and keep” arrangements reduced transaction costs and
created little friction as long as traffic was reasonably balanced.
If adjacent carriers could deliver traffic to each other seamlessly, they could surely deliver
and accept traffic from more distant locations as well. Until the 1970s, however, such traffic was
generally handled by only one carrier -- a “long-distance” carrier in U.S. parlance. The local switches
that transferred such calls from the national network to each local distribution system (or vice versa)
were generally equipped to transfer calls to and from only one long-distance carrier -- in the United
States it was generally AT&T. There was no reason to accommodate other carriers because the
government or the regulator did not allow additional competing national carriers.
Entry first occurred in the transmission and switching of national (long-distance) calls in the
U.S. in the 1970s and in Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia in the 1980s. This
entry was largely unanticipated and, at first, even unwanted by the U.S. regulator, the Federal
Communications Commission.
12 Few had realized that the development of microwave technology
had made the long-distance business contestable, and even fewer national authorities thought that
such technological change warranted a shift from the monopoly provision of all telecom services.
The introduction of competition in the transmission and switching of these national calls could have
occurred with little controversy had the regulatory authorities not been requiring these calls to be
priced to cross-subsidize local connections. In the United States, AT&T reacted with alarm to the
development of such competition because it rightly feared that the loss of even a small part of this
business would reduce the flow of “contributions to cover losses on its local network, particularly
in less-dense, rural areas. It therefore resisted connecting its rivals' calls to its local network.
Eventually, the U.S. regulators found a solution to this problem, but only after AT&T was
broken up as the result of its aggressive behavior that was induced by the distorted rate structure.
Each local carrier would be required to modify its switches to accept all long-distance carriers' calls
on an equal basis and allow customers to originate calls on any competitive carrier with the same13 In the U.S., this requirement was built into the 1982 court decree settling the federal antitrust suit against
AT&T.
14 There is a growing literature on these issues. See for example, Laffont, Rey,  and Tirole (1998a and
1998b). For a useful recent contribution that is not as sanguine as the views expressed herein, see Brennan (1997).
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ease of dialing.
13 Local switches had to be modified to accept rival long-distance calls on an equal
basis, and an explicit tax had to be levied on all such calls -- called a “carrier access charge” -- to
keep the subsidies flowing. “Interconnection” in this case was solved quite neatly by simply
mandating equal treatment of all carriers. There have been essentially no problems with this system
over the past 15 years in the United States.
  This is not to say that some regulation was not necessary. All carriers have an interest in
being able to connect with other carriers, but an incumbent monopolist may find that its optimal
strategy is to refuse interconnection to new carriers, thereby making it impossible for nascent carriers
to survive. Once the entrants succeed in achieving sufficient size, the incentives change and each
carrier finds that interconnection is in its own independent interest. Thus, a requirement for
reciprocal traffic-termination agreements is probably a necessity for the development of competition.
But regulating the rates charged for such arrangements is arguably necessary only for the case of new
small-scale entry against an incumbent monopolist.
14
Telecommunications network technologies have been changing at a very rapid pace. Fiber
optic cables have replaced microwave transmission systems. Electronic switches have replaced
electromechanical switches, allowing the development of a wide variety of software-delivered
services, such as voice mail, call forwarding, and automatic number identification. Packet switching
has replaced circuit switching for large data applications, such as the Internet. Despite all of these
changes, there have been few problems in accommodating the essential traffic-exchange function
that is required for competition in this network industry. Long-distance carriers, local telephone
companies, private networks, Internet Service Providers, and international carriers interconnect
seamlessly with few major technical problems. Competition flourishes where government lets it, and
most disputes center on the prices of regulated services offered by those carriers that are still
regulated.
Given this relatively steady and rather tranquil technological evolution, why has the market
evolution in the United States and other countries been so racked with controversy? Why have
incumbents resisted so strongly and found themselves engulfed in litigation when their counterparts15 For evidence on the U.S. and Canada, see Crandall and Waverman (1996).
16 The FCC has jurisdiction only over an artificially-determined 25 percent of the non-traffic sensitive costs
of local service; the states have jurisdiction over the remainder. The FCC cannot force the states to convert their
portion of the “universal-service” subsidy to a transferrable, cost-based tax on telecom services similar to that being
erected in the federal jurisdiction.
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in trucking, airlines, and other industries (not natural gas) succumbed to competition with much less
controversy and litigation? The answers are relatively straightforward.
Liberalization without Deregulation: The Perpetuation of Cross Subsidies
The first reason why telecommunications is different is that regulators have traditionally
allowed rates to deviate substantially from efficient levels with national and international calls cross-
subsidizing local connections.
15 With these rates in place, incumbents naturally respond very
aggressively to the loss of market share in national or international calls. Since these incumbents are
typically vertically integrated, providing all telecommunications services, their local network
connections are essential for originating and terminating the new rivals' calls. In the United States,
AT&T was so resistant to offering interconnection to its first long-distance rival that it brought a
federal antitrust suit upon itself.
As mentioned above, the cross-subsidies can be maintained in the face of entry through a tax
on national and international calls that is collected by the local companies as a carrier access charge.
But once this charge becomes explicit, it becomes politically vulnerable, and it provides the new
carriers with the incentive to look for other ways to connect its calls.
The United States is now in the process of attempting to introduce competition into all
telecom markets while maintaining the subsidies for local residential connections, particularly in the
more rural areas of the country. The 1996 Telecommunications Act orders the FCC to develop a
system of explicit subsidies for such connections and to collect the subsidy monies through an
explicit charge on all telecommunications carriers.
16 Unfortunately, the Commission cannot possibly
measure with precision the degree to which each subscriber must be subsidized, given its
geographical location. Therefore, if retail rates continue to be regulated and explicit subsidies are
established for various classes of customers, the incentives for competitive entry will necessarily be
quite distorted.17 See Bernheim and Willig ( 1996) for a thorough discussion of these possibilities.
18 Japan has broken NTT into separate local operating companies and a long-distance company, but all are
within the same holding company.
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Interestingly, these cross-subsidies seem much less important in the U.S. electricity sector.
Subsidies to rural cooperatives have generally been in the form of explicit capital subsidies, but they
are embedded in the rate structure. Therefore, electricity deregulation is likely to have much less
effect on the structure of relative electricity prices.
 
Vertical Integration of the Incumbent 
The U.S. experience of being the first to introduce competition into a telecom market
bedeviled by distorted regulated rates created a hostile environment for interconnection with a
vertically-integrated incumbent that has poisoned regulatory and legislative debates for the past 15
years. A federal antitrust suit succeeded in vertically divesting AT&T's operating companies from
its other operations, thereby creating a widespread view that attempts at vertical foreclosure would
be so pervasive that no local monopolist should be allowed to offer vertically-related services in
competition with other sellers of such services. The theory that the local monopolist would engage
in overt and subtle forms of vertical foreclosure that could not be detected or prevented by regulators
has become so well accepted that even today, fifteen years after the AT&T divestiture and three years
after the 1996 Telecommunications Act, no former Bell operating company is allowed to offer more
than a modicum of long-distance services.
17 This quarantine is unique among developed countries
to the United States and, even then, only to U.S. wire-based telecommunications services.
No other developed country has chosen to vertically fragment its telecommunications sector
in the manner of the U.S.
18  The United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand have allowed
competitive entry into long-distance services for a number of years, but Bell Canada, British
Telecom, and New Zealand Telephone remain vertically integrated. Most European countries are in
the process of privatizing their national telecommunications companies, but none is breaking them
up into vertically-separated companies. For the most part, this vertical integration continues without
controversy because local/long-distance interconnection is so straightforward and easily regulated.19 It is often argued that New Zealand has erred badly because of its abandonment of all regulation, but it is
surely too early to tell. It is quite true, however, that in New Zealand regulatory controversy was simply replaced by
litigation over interconnection conditions.
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In fact, the United Kingdom does not even require equal access, and New Zealand has no regulation
at all.
19
Perhaps more telling is the fact that in the U.S. the divested Bell local companies are denied
the ability to offer national or international calling services from their wireline facilities, but each
is allowed to compete in wireless services and to allow all types of calls through cellular or PCS
handsets. These Bell-owned wireless services have competed with non-Bell wireless services for
more than 15 years without any hint of vertical foreclosure despite the fact that most wireless calls
in the Bell companies’ territories require termination on the Bell-owned local wireline network. The
Bell's cellular operations were never able to obtain significantly more than 50 percent of the market
in the first 12 years of an FCC-decreed duopoly. Nor have the local-exchange companies been
accused of attempting to thwart the recent entry of two, three, or more new PCS carriers despite the
fact that each needs to interconnect with the  local operating companies, including the Bell
companies, in order to offer service.
Furthermore, the Bell companies have been allowed to offer information services for most
of the past decade without any controversy over their use of their networks for unfair competitive
advantage. I am unaware that they are very important players in this market, much less the dominant
force that one might expect if vertical integration created opportunities for excluding rivals.
Finally, we have years of experience with other U.S. vertically-integrated, regulated local
telecommunications carriers. Sprint, GTE, SNET, and Frontier have offered local and long-distance
services over their local networks with little attendant controversy, and in some cases, for years.
Were they able to effect subtle discrimination against their long-distance competitors, the results
would be easily detected by now -- in the form of outsized market shares. Such evidence simply does
not exist, undoubtedly because such exclusionary conduct is difficult to shield from public scrutiny.
In short, the problems of vertical integration in telecommunications derived in no small part
from the distorted pricing structure that regulators allowed to develop. There is much less reason to
worry about vertical foreclosure as long as interconnection with the vertically-integrated incumbent
involves the simple exchange of traffic. It is only when “interconnection” takes on a far different
meaning that major problems occur.20 See Huber, Kellogg, and Thorne (1996) for a thorough description of this legislation.
21 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 251 (c) (3).
22 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 252 (d) (1).
23 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 252 (d) (3).
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“Interconnection” as Managed Competition 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act ushered in a new era of telecom policy in the United
States that mobilized teams of economists and lawyers into constant battle over a new baroque and
rather bizarre notion of interconnection.
20 Following on an earlier, failed notion of Open Network
Architecture that had been tried by the FCC, the Congress enacted a set of requirements for local
carriers that were ostensibly designed to overcome first-mover and natural-monopoly advantages of
the incumbent local carriers. Unfortunately, they overreached and created a regulatory monstrosity.
Entry into U.S. long-distance services began twenty years ago. By 1996, the U.S. long
distance sector had become substantially more competitive than it was when the Bell companies
were divested from AT&T. In large part, this was due to the imposition of equal access for all
national carriers -- not to the divestiture itself. Local telephony was still a monopoly, however,
because state regulators had succeeded in restricting entry into most local and intrastate markets.
In 1996, Congress accepted the theory that entry into all telecommunications was desirable,
but that such entry into local access-exchange markets had to be promoted through the forced resale
of incumbents’ local networks -- in whole or in part, at the choosing of the entrant. As a result, the
1996 Act requires the unbundling of networks at any “technically feasible point”
21  -- which could
mean everywhere and anywhere a prospective entrant desires. The prices of these unbundled
“elements” must be based on costs that are “determined without regard to a rate-of-return or other
cost-based proceeding” and “may include a reasonable profit.”
22 In addition, an entrant may simply
resell an incumbent’s entire service by obtaining it at the retail price of the service less “marketing,
billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided by the (incumbent) local exchange carrier.”
23
There are so many problems with this approach, that it is difficult to compress them into a
single paper. First, the entire approach casts the Commission back into the business of cost-based
regulation, but this time with a vengeance. In the past, it simply required regulated firms to stay24 After the introduction of private microwave in the late 1950s, AT&T attempted to erect a highly-
discriminatory tariff structure for private line services. For more than 15 years, it debated with the FCC over the
adequacy of the cost justification of these tariffs, but the matter was never resolved. See Walter G. Bolter (1978).
25 Bolter (1978).
26 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board No. 97-286.
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within a maximum regulated return. Later, when competition first reared its head, the Commission
tried to rule on the regulated firms’ cost studies, but it generally concluded that these cost studies
were inadequate.
24 Now, the Commission and, presumably, the states are forced to determine the cost
of each “element” of a network without knowing just what constitutes efficient network design in
the first place. Moreover, the Commission and the states must supervise the determination of
“avoided” costs of retailing, which are largely joint and common costs of maintaining marketing and
billing systems. Economists know how controversial and essentially insoluble these problems have
been in the past.
25
Second, even if the Commission could divine the costs of each network element, there is no
clear guidance from Congress as to how these costs are to be measured. Flipping a coin is certainly
in the set of alternatives to a “rate-of-return or cost-based proceedings.” The Commission has chosen
to use forward-looking costs for at least two reasons: (1) they reflect the cost of building a network
today (an awesome task that purportedly cannot be undertaken by entrants) and (2) they can at least
be approximated by assembling an engineering-economic model, a task that has occupied the
Commission staff for at least two years. This decision by the FCC has been the most controversial
aspect of the controversial process of implementing the 1996 Act, provoking the incumbents and
several states to challenge the FCC’s authority to take over the rate-setting process, an appeal that
has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court.
26 Constitutional takings are likely to follow.
Third, it is obvious that by creating such ample opportunities for entrants to use incumbents’
network facilities, the Act discourages investment in new facilities. But if “deregulation” and
liberalization are to accomplish their principal purpose, they must encourage the construction of new
facilities -- by entrants and incumbents alike -- that are designed to serve today’s market with today’s
and tomorrow’s technology. The major benefits of deregulation would be lost if the exercise were
simply to collapse into a sharing of facilities built while the numbing effects of regulation were in
place. Leasing yesterday’s technology to today’s rivals at tomorrow’s cost may sound good in the14
political arena, but it makes little economic sense and surely provides no incentives for investment
for either the lessor or the lessee.
Fourth, the decision to unbundle everything and to require its leasing at cost-based rates is
wildly excessive. Requiring that incumbents grant access to their “bottleneck” facilities might make
sense for at least a period of time, but there is no need to require access to those facilities that could
(and should) be replicated in some form by entrants. To do so invites endless regulatory disputes and
creates major barriers to investment in upgrading existing network facilities. If an incumbent carrier
has begun to lease access to its switching, transport, and network-control facilities, it risks regulatory
intervention or perhaps even an antitrust action if it attempts to modify this network architecture to
reflect new technologies or the demand for new services. For example, what happens when a
competitor who is leasing access to the incumbent’s circuit switches is notified that the circuit
switches are being removed because the incumbent, like AT&T (which is unregulated) is replacing
its circuit-switched network with a more efficient packet-switched network? Does the incumbent
have to maintain obsolete technology that is priced at forward-looking incremental cost?  This surely
is not “forward-looking” regulation.  
Fifth, there is no date-certain deregulation of all of these resale, unbundling, and pricing
rules. The FCC is authorized to forbear where it thinks that competition is adequate to replace
regulation, but it has little incentive to do so. Indeed, by building enormous, complicated cost models
that apply to every aspect of incumbents’ operations, the Commission has already set in motion a
chain of events that will keep it occupied for years, if not for decades. Every complicated 600-page
ruling is appealed to the courts, requiring two to three years of litigation. Given the complex,
controversial nature of its rules, the Commission inevitably is faced with a remand that requires
some changes, which themselves will be appealed to the courts. By that time, new issues will have
arisen. For instance, by simply unbundling existing facilities, the Commission provided an opening
to those who would like to lease only a portion of a network element, such as only a given range of
frequencies over the copper subscriber line or “loop.” Once the Commission decides on this
“spectrum unbundling” proposal and suffers through the ensuing litigation, it will be faced with
trying to allocate the cost of the loop across frequencies! Should the cost be linear in MHZ used, or
is the forward-looking cost of providing high frequencies more than the forward-looking cost of the
lower frequencies? Alternatively, should the costs be allocated in inverse relationship to the derived
price elasticity of demand of the spectrum in various uses? Or, better yet, perhaps these wholesale27 Jerry Hausman has raised this point in proceedings before the FCC involving its interconnection
regulations. See Federal Communications Commission (1996).
28 The spirit of this section is much better captured by Kahn (1998), who is critical of telecommunications
“deregulation” for a number of reasons that I do not address in this paper. See also a recent contribution by Sidak
and Spulber (1998).
29 See, in particular, Winston (1993 and 1998).
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prices should be set on the basis of the efficient-component pricing rule. As long as full unbundling
is not subject to sunset, it will give rise to repeated attempts to expand on it and to complicate it in
ways that we cannot even envision today. After all, there is no limit to the ideas that I may have for
using your property at prices that are as low as those I could obtain by building the facilities myself.
Sixth, little thought has been given to the pricing of network elements to reflect risk taking.
Surely, the lease price should reflect the length of term of the contract. If an entrant is to gain access
to the facility at forward-looking cost, including the incumbent’s cost of capital, he should have to
lease the facility for its entire expected life. If the lease can be terminated at the whim of the lessee,
the price should be much higher.
27
Finally, all requirements for access to bottleneck facilities should be conditioned on a
determination that the bottleneck still exists. Given the rapid rate at which costs of alternative paths
to the subscriber are falling -- coaxial cable (cable television), terrestrial wireless, stationary
satellites, and low-orbiting satellites -- how long can a piece of copper be a “bottleneck?”
Unfortunately, the ability of entrants simply to lease copper loops rather than developing new
technologies on these alternative media serves to perpetuate the bottleneck. It is always better in the
political arena to argue that you are an unfortunate hostage to the powerful existing players than to
take the risk of deploying capital and trying to innovate around them.
“Deregulation” Should Mean Deregulation
28
Our experience with earlier deregulatory exercises tells us that the  benefits of such exercises
derive from unfettered markets finding better, lower-cost ways to deliver services.
29 Deregulation
in these sectors typically involved the substitution of market forces for government controls on prices
and outputs. In telecommunications, and potentially in electricity, there is little “deregulation.”30 This is the policy envisioned in  Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 254, which remains a “vision.”
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Instead, managed competition is replacing managed monopoly under the assumption that
government can manage the transition better than market forces could.
Unfortunately, this managed competition is based in large part on assuming that sharing the
infrastructure built under all of the distorted incentives created by regulation will somehow lead to
efficient competition. Telecommunications regulators are busily building models of the cost of
simply replicating these facilities at today's costs. They have no idea of the ideal architecture nor of
the services that might be offered if the regulatory shackles were unleashed from the incumbents and
if entrants actually committed capital to their enterprise. True deregulation would require that all
prices and service levels be determined by market forces, not a regulatory embrace (or suffocation)
of the existing infrastructure.
Clearly, regulators are horrified by the possibility that the monopolies they nurtured and
protected for years would now be permitted to set prices without any regulatory constraint
whatsoever. In part, this fear is justified because surely some rates that have been kept below long-
run incremental cost by regulation would rise, perhaps sharply. In addition, some rates might rise
sharply simply because competitors would not yet be present to respond, while still other services
might not be subject to efficient competition. But there is a way to pursue full deregulation while
minimizing such disruptions. It is not simply to tax all services and to deliver the proceeds to the
erstwhile objects of the regulators' affection.
30 Rather, it is to announce a date sufficiently far in the
future at which regulation will cease, much as the Congress did for airlines in 1978. This places
potential competitors and customers on notice that fully flexible rates will be in place on this date
and that new opportunities could be available for both. It also would reduce the present value of rent
seeking before the regulatory commissions.
Were the Congress to set all telecommunications rates free in, say, three years, one might
expect a great deal of investment activity in those technologies that are promising sources of
contestability for the  incumbents' services. I would expect very rapid build-out of wireless facilities
and a major merger movement to coalesce this sector into four or five large, national players.
Similarly, I would expect cable television companies to accelerate their modernization plans to be
ready to capitalize on the opportunities created by rising residential rates three years hence. Finally,
I would expect major changes in the incumbent LECs' strategies from one based in part on fending17
off regulation to one intently focused on fending off new entrants. After that, no one knows how the
sector will evolve. If we couldn't predict the effect of deregulation on trucking or airlines, why
should we expect to have even a hint at how telecommunications will develop when it is free from
regulation?18
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